Field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are being increasingly used in a wide
range of critical applications, including industrial, automotive,
medical, and military systems. Since FPGA vendors are typically fabless,
it is more economical to outsource device production to off-shore
facilities. This introduces many opportunities for the insertion of
malicious alterations of FPGA devices in the foundry, referred to as
hardware Trojan attacks, that can cause logical and physical
malfunctions during field operation. The vulnerability of these devices
to hardware attacks raises serious security concerns regarding hardware
and design assurance. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of
FPGA-specific hardware Trojan attacks based on activation and payload
characteristics along with Trojan models that can be inserted by an
attacker. We also present an efficient Trojan detection method for FPGA
based on a combined approach of logic-testing and side-channel analysis.
Finally, we propose a novel design approach, referred to as Adapted
Triple Modular Redundancy (ATMR), to reliably protect against Trojan
circuits of varying forms in FPGA devices. We compare ATMR with the
conventional TMR approach. The results demonstrate the advantages of
ATMR over TMR with respect to power overhead, while maintaining the same
or higher level of security and performances as TMR. Further
improvement in overhead associated with ATMR is achieved by exploiting
reconfiguration and time-sharing of resources.
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